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Abstract 
 
 
This essay evaluates Jean-Luc Marion’s claim in The Erotic Phenomenon that eros and agape are “two 
names selected among an infinity of others in order to think and to say the one love” (221).  I will defend 
his attempt to unite agape and eros against Jacques Derrida’s claim that we must love without any desire 
for reciprocity.  Additionally, I will indicate what implications Marion’s account of love has for a 
discussion of love and its reasons.  Marion correctly identifies the paradox at the heart of love: that in 
order to truly love, I must give up my demand for assurance, although I may still maintain the hope that 
another will love me.  While Marion offers an important corrective to Derrida’s account of pure agape, I 
will argue that his account of love that includes both eros and agape ultimately resembles Derrida’s pure 
agape too closely because Marion does not sufficiently acknowledge the role of reciprocity in love. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In The Erotic Phenomenon, the French phenomenologist and theologian Jean-Luc 
Marion argues that agape and eros are “two names selected among an infinity of others 
in order to think and to say the one love” (2007: 221).  The claim stands in marked 
contrast to Anders Nygren’s influential distinctions between eros and agape as well as 
Jacques Derrida’s more recent claims that to truly love another demands the complete 
absence of reciprocity.  In this essay I will evaluate Marion’s claim about the unity of 
agape and eros and argue that Marion’s account of love is a significant improvement 
over Jacques Derrida’s call for an agape without reciprocity.  However, despite the 
relative strengths of Marion’s position, I will eventually critique Marion for failing to 
adequately account for reciprocity in love, which leads to his erotic phenomenon falling 
into the same pitfalls as Derrida’s account of pure agape.  Along the way I will also 
indicate what implications Marion’s account of love has for a discussion of the reasons 
why we love.   
 
 
_____________________________ 
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Eros and Agape: Traditional Distinctions 
 
In attempting to distinguish between agape and eros, Anders Nygren argues that there 
is no ground for comparison because they share absolutely nothing in common, but are 
in fact two different approaches to life: “For what could Eros and Agape have in 
common?  There seems to be no possibility of discovering any idea common to them 
both which might serve as a starting-point for the comparison; for at every point the 
opposition between them makes itself felt” (1953: 209).  Despite Nygren’s concerns 
that there is no common-ground for comparison, I think it is helpful to note two major 
differences between agape and eros so that we can see how Marion’s phenomenology 
of love calls into question the traditional definitions of agape and eros.  
 
One major distinction often drawn between agape and eros is that agape is self-
forgetful while eros is self-interested: “[The] contrast between Agape and Eros is 
popularly seen as a special case of the contrast between altruism and self-interest” 
(Adams 1980: 95). Nygren himself calls agape “unselfish love” but eros is “egocentric 
love” (1953: 209).  Even thinkers far less extreme than Nygren hold to the basic self-
forgetful/self-interested distinction.  For example, C.S. Lewis calls agape “gift-love” 
and eros “need-love” (1988).  The clear implication from Lewis’s terms is that agape is 
a self-forgetful love that gives itself away to the other whereas eros is a love that 
desires something from the lover.  As Vincent Brummer nicely summarizes Lewis’s 
distinction, “[eros] (or need-love) is the desire to receive that from the other which I 
need in order to be happy or to flourish.  Agape (or gift-love) is the attitude of giving 
myself in service to the other” (1993: 110).  Gift-love is a benevolent love that aims not 
at the self but only the good of the other, whereas eros is a desiring love that needs the 
other. 
 
A second major distinction between eros and agape is that eros responds to some 
attractive value in the beloved, but agape loves what is not lovable:  “Agape is a regard 
… for every person qua human existent” (Outka 1972: 9).  Because agape is self-
forgetful, it does not need to be drawn to the beloved by any unique or attractive quality 
that the beloved possesses.  It is often seen as a dispassionate bestowal of love on the 
beloved.  On this account it seems that the purest form of agape occurs when one loves 
something that has no value whatsoever apart from the lover’s agape.  Referring to the 
purest form of agape as “Divine Gift-Love” Lewis describes it this way:  “But Divine 
Gift-love . . . is wholly disinterested and desires what is simply best for the beloved. . .  
Divine Gift-love in the man enables him to love what is not naturally lovable” (1988: 
128).  Pure agape is a disinterested desire for the good of another who is not naturally 
loveable in him or her self.  In contrast to agape, eros is an interested love that takes 
delight in another person because the other satisfies our needs or desires: “[Eros] 
appears as . . . the passionate impulse to the satisfaction of the lover’s need, the 
fulfillment of his desire” (Armstrong 1961: 105).1 Eros is attracted to something in the 
object and so desires that for him or her self.    
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Agape, Eros, and Love’s Reasons 
 
Another way to frame the traditional distinctions between agape and eros is to consider 
the reasons why we love the beloved in each form of love.  According to Nygren, when 
I love another person with agape this is a purely disinterested love.  I am not 
responding to any inherent value in the beloved because agape loves precisely what is 
unlovable.  The reason why I love another rests entirely on my own decision to love 
without any reasons beyond my will’s decision to bestow love.   
 
On the other hand, eros responds directly to value in the beloved.  At least on Nygren’s 
account, the reason why I love with eros is that I see something that I desire and want it 
for my own.  Eros responds to some perceived value in the beloved.  Thus the reason 
why I love another with eros is that I want the perceived good in the beloved for 
myself.  
 
 
Derrida’s Pure Agape 
 
In his account of the gift, Jacques Derrida implicitly accepts Nygren’s extreme 
distinction between agape and eros, arguing that agape is the only true form of love.  
But Derrida takes the traditional differences even further when he claims that to give a 
gift requires that I do so without any hint of reciprocity.2
 
       
Derrida insists that there are a number of paradoxes in giving a gift, because for my gift 
to be a true gift it must occur apart from any economic relationship:  “But is not the 
gift, if there is any, also that which interrupts economy?  That which, in suspending 
economic calculation, no longer gives rise to exchange?  That which opens the circle so 
as to defy reciprocity or symmetry, the common measure, and so as to turn aside the 
return in view of the no-return?” (Derrida 1992: 7).  When I give a gift, I cannot view it 
as a way for someone to pay me back.  I must give a gift without the expectation of 
receiving something in return simply because I have given a gift.  Derrida is certainly 
correct that a pure or ideal gift will be one in which I give without demanding a 
reciprocal gift in return.  No one appreciates receiving what one thought was a ‘free 
gift’ only to find extensive strings attached.  We would rather not have received such a 
gift in the first place.  However, Derrida maintains that to give a pure gift requires not 
just that the donor suspend her demand to receive a similar gift in return, but that there 
must be no acknowledgement of the gift at all. 
 
Derrida argues that in order for there to be a pure gift, the gift must never be 
acknowledged because once it is acknowledged the gift enters into economic 
calculation.  Even a ‘thank you’ or some other recognition of the gift returns the gift to 
the economy:  “The moment the gift, however generous it be, is infected with the 
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slightest hint of calculation . . . it falls within the ambit of an economy: it exchanges, in 
short it gives counterfeit money, since it gives in exchange for payment” (Derrida 1995: 
112)  As Robyn Horner rightly explains, any acknowledgment disqualifies the gift 
because acknowledgement introduces reciprocity which is foreign to the gift:  “On the 
part of the donor, any recognition of the gift as gift anticipates some kind of return.  For 
according to Derrida, whenever I intentionally give, I invariably receive.  I may receive 
another tangible gift, or I may simply receive gratitude.  Even if the worst happened, 
and my giving were greeted with displeasure or rejection, there would still be some 
return, if nothing more than the reinforcement of my own identity as a subject” (Horner 
2001: 8).  So, any gift that is acknowledged by anyone in any way becomes part of an 
economy.   
 
Derrida eventually concludes that even if the recipient does not recognize my gift as a 
gift, but I know that I have given it, the gift still enters economic calculation because I 
acknowledge it to myself.  In order to give a gift, we must therefore give without 
knowing that we are giving it.  Thus, we cannot give any object:  “One must give 
without knowing, without knowledge or recognition, without thanks [remerciement]:  
without anything, or at least without any object” (1995: 112)  Derrida concludes that 
one of the paradoxes in thinking about the gift is that we cannot give anything because 
in giving an object we would recognize it and it would enter into economic calculation.  
He argues that the gift can only be thought of as impossible:  “Not impossible but the 
impossible.  The very figure of the impossible.  It announces itself, gives itself to be 
thought as the impossible” (1992: 7).  For Derrida, the gift is at the outer limit of 
thought.  We simply cannot conceive of a gift in which nothing is given, or a gift that 
we do not even know we are giving.  However, Derrida argues that the demands of the 
gift require that it must be given entirely apart from any possible reciprocity.3
  
  
Therefore, according to Derrida, giving a true gift is actually impossible.  The gift is a 
never completed ideal that our actual gift-giving should attempt to emulate.  
So what does Derrida’s account of the gift say about love?  While Derrida sticks to the 
strict phenomenological requirements demanded by the gift, there are some clear 
implications for an account of love, the preeminent gift because it is a gift of myself to 
another.  Derrida’s requirement that a gift be given apart from all possible economic 
calculation implies that love’s purest, and perhaps only, form is agape.  My love must 
be so entirely self-forgetful that I do not even know I am giving a gift.  My giving must 
be in secret so that another will not acknowledge my love for her.  Derrida argues that 
Jesus’ teaching in the Gospel of Matthew implies that our good deeds must be done in 
secret so that they will not be acknowledged:  “On three occasions [in chapter six of the 
Gospel of Matthew] there returns this truth, like some obsessive reminder to be learned 
by heart.  It is the sentence ‘and thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee.’  . .  
In fact God asks that one give without knowing, without calculating, reckoning, or 
hoping, for one must give without counting, and that is what takes it outside of sense” 
(1995: 97).  Derrida argues that to truly give a gift, i.e. to love, requires that one 
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suspend all economic calculation, even the desire for the love to be acknowledged and a 
relationship to be established.  Derrida thus advocates a radical form of agape in which 
there can be no hint of reciprocity, otherwise the love is not love but economic 
calculation.  
 
Because love demands that I give of myself without any hint of reciprocity, love is 
impossible.  We cannot truly love another person because there is no way to perform a 
loving action without that action being acknowledged.  Even if I keep it secret from any 
other person I cannot keep it secret from myself.  Love is an ideal that we attempt to 
live up to, but we can never say that we have truly loved.  While Derrida is correct that 
to truly love someone is an extremely difficult thing, has he accurately described love?  
I believe that Derrida is mistaken in his claim that love is without reciprocity; to love 
another person requires that I desire a relationship with the other.  As we will see, 
Marion rightly acknowledges that to love another requires the hope that the other will 
love me in return.   
 
 
Marion’s Phenomenology of Love 
 
In stark contrast to Nygren’s and Derrida’s insistence that agape and eros are entirely 
distinct and that agape is the only true form of love, Marion offers his phenomenology 
of the erotic phenomenon.4
 
  Marion’s goal in The Erotic Phenomenon is to think about 
love from itself and through itself.  He wants to consider love apart from every external 
category imposed upon it so that he can give a unified account of love, one that does 
not hastily divide agape and eros:  
[E]very concept of love is weakened and compromised as soon as one 
allows oneself to distinguish competing divergent, or indeed 
irreconcilable, meanings for example, by opposing from the outset, as if 
it were unquestionable evidence, love and charity (eros and agape), 
supposedly possessive desire and supposedly gratuitous benevolence, 
rational love (of the moral law) and irrational passion.  A serious 
concept of love distinguishes itself by its unity, or rather by its power to 
keep together significations that nonerotic thought cuts apart, stretches, 
and tears according to the measure of its prejudices (2007: 4-5). 
 
Marion believes that if we think about love in itself, apart from any alien categories, 
then we can find a unified concept of love.  But how can we think about love by itself?  
Marion’s answer is that love is a saturated phenomenon.5  In other words, it is a 
phenomenon that gives itself to be experienced according to its own rules and terms: 
“[Love] does not admit reason or logic other than its own, and only becomes legible 
beginning from there” (2007: 217).  If love must be thought according to its own 
reasons, then how are we to understand love?   
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Marion claims that love is what gives me assurance.  I want to be loved because love 
gives me the assurance that I matter, that my existence is worthwhile to another person.  
Even if Descartes is right that I can be certain that I exist, this certain knowledge cannot 
assure me against the vanity of life. The assurance that life is worth living must come 
from someone who loves me:  “Receiving assurance against the vanity of my certain 
existence does not depend upon me, but requires that I learn from elsewhere that I am 
and above all if I have to be.  Holding out when faced with vanity, which is to say 
obtaining the justification to be from elsewhere, means that I am, not by being (even 
through myself, even as a privileged being), but insofar as I am loved (and thus chosen 
from elsewhere)” (2007: 23).  If I have never been loved by anyone, then I consider life 
to be meaningless.  Consequently, Marion defines love (whether agape, eros, or philia) 
as that which provides my life with meaning.  When I ask the most fundamental human 
question, ‘Does anyone love me?,’ I am looking for someone to act and feel towards me 
in a way that gives me the assurance that my life matters. 
 
By defining love in terms of the question, ‘Does anyone love me?,’ Marion does not 
define love based on an interpretation of how we commonly use the term, but defines it 
as that which gives me assurance:  “[T]he cases of love all converge in the lover losing 
his primacy and, in every circumstance, exposing himself to the unique question of 
vanity: ‘Does anyone out there love me?’ . . .  Outside of this reduction, there is no 
love, and no lover” (2007: 217)  Because Marion defines love as that which gives me 
value, love begins from my desire for assurance.  Only a love that could assure me 
counts as love.   
 
One consequence of defining love as that which assures me that my existence matters is 
that much of what we refer to as love is not love at all.  For example, a promise to love 
for a determinate amount of time does not qualify as love because it cannot assure me.  
If another loves me for a determinate time, I recognize that it is not a love that assures 
me that I am worthwhile.  It is just an agreement to put up with me for a certain amount 
of time.  A manipulative love also cannot assure me because the relationship is entirely 
controlled by the manipulator.  If I am manipulated I may in fact grow depressed and 
conclude that my existence does not matter.  Because Marion defines love as that which 
assures me that I am valuable, only love from someone outside me can assure me.  But 
where does Marion’s account leave self-love?  Is self-love not really love at all?  
 
 
The Impossibility of Self-Love 
 
It seems quite clear that impoverished versions of love such as manipulation or 
seduction cannot assure me that I have value, but what about self-love?  Does loving 
myself satisfy my desire to be loved, even if no one out there loves me?  If the question 
is answered affirmatively, then we have no need to seek love outside of ourselves, but 
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we only need to love ourselves.  However, Marion argues that not only does self-love 
not reassure us but also that direct self-love is impossible because it ends in self-hatred.   
The main reason why self-love cannot assure me is that love must exceed my 
expectations.  If I can expect the love that someone gives to me, then I cannot be 
assured by it.  I will think it is simply my due: “For the measure of this love requires 
loving without measure—without common measure with what I expect and imagine, 
failing which I will not believe in it.  And, barring its excess, love remains lacking” 
(2007: 46).  The love that assures me must outweigh the vanity that confronts me.  It 
must be powerful enough to overcome the question, ‘Does it really matter?’  If 
someone for whom I have no regard loves me, my response is, “So what?”  It does not 
matter to me that this person loves me.  In a similar way, if I were to love myself the 
love would not be strong enough to overcome vanity.  I would not be assured by it 
because I would not think that my love was worth anything. 
 
However, at this point some may object and argue that self-love in the form of self-
preservation is a perfectly natural and universally human impulse.  Everyone has an 
immediate love for the self because everyone desires to stay alive.  However, for 
Marion we do not have an automatic desire to persevere in our being.  I can hate my 
existence as much as love it.  For Marion, the central question of human existence is 
whether anyone loves me.  If this question is not answered affirmatively, then I have no 
natural self-love, no natural desire to persevere in my being:  “For I can just as easily 
not esteem my being as lovable, I can always hate being, out of disgust or impotence; I 
can even deny myself the right and above all the duty to encumber the world of my 
fellows with my pathetic claim to persist in my pitiable being.  Being—should a lover 
necessarily love it, and love it for itself, as fitting to him in the rank of lover?  Nothing 
is less assured” (2007: 50).  Therefore, self-love rooted in the perseverance of one’s 
existence is an illusion according to Marion.  It cannot assure me in any sense because I 
need a reason to persevere in my being other than the brute fact that I exist. 
 
Marion believes that any attempt to love ourselves directly ends in self-hatred and not 
self-love.  He argues that our desire for assurance, the demand that someone else loves 
me, reveals not that self-love is at the core of our existence, but that self-hatred is our 
primary affection: 
 
Nothing is more evident than love of self and perseverance in one’s 
being, at least in the natural attitude; but as soon as we enter the erotic 
reduction, each appears as a logical contradiction, or more exactly, an 
erotic contradiction.  To have done with these illusions, we will establish 
once and for all the exact opposite thesis—no one can love himself, and 
surely not with an unconditional self-love, because every man for 
himself finds, more original than the alleged self-love, self-hatred in 
himself (2007: 53). 
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Marion claims that the result of our search for assurance is that we do not love 
ourselves, but we actually hate ourselves.   
 
The reason that I do not have self-love is because, as finite, I know I am not worthy of 
love.  Marion thinks that I experience myself as finite by reflecting on my own inability 
to love perfectly.  The experience of my own finitude forces me to realize that I cannot 
provide the assurance that I am looking for because I need an infinite love to assure me: 
“[T]he finitude of the self only feels itself adequately assured if an infinite love assures 
it; in short, the finite receives assurance from nothing less than the infinite.  The finite, 
in order to resist vanity and its ‘What’s the use?’ requires an assurance, and thus an 
infinite love” (2007: 55). Because I know I am finite, I realize I cannot possibly assure 
myself.  So, even if I could love myself in an immediate sense prior to receiving 
assurance from the outside, this self-love could not assure me because I require an 
infinite love, a love that I cannot see the beginning or end of.  This must be a love that 
comes from outside me and appears as something unexpected. 6
 
 
 
The Recovery of Self-Love 
 
From Marion’s claim that we cannot assure ourselves directly by self-love, it may seem 
that Marion wishes to completely remove self-love from all love.  If Marion denies all 
self-love, then he would agree with Nygren and Derrida that true love is without any 
reference to the self.  However, this is not the case.  Just because direct self-love is 
impossible by itself does not mean that self-love is entirely absent from my love for 
another.  Clarifying Marion’s position requires continuing with his phenomenology of 
love.  
 
When I demand that another love me I am well aware of the injustice of this claim.  I 
recognize that I am not deserving of assurance.  At this stage I am demanding assurance 
from the other because I need to be loved.  But my demand to be loved shows that I 
have not yet understood love.  When I demand that another assure me, I am looking to 
get something out of her; I am considering love to be an economic exchange (2007: 
69). 
 
I have not yet understood that love suspends reciprocity.  Love must be given without 
reason and without the expectation of exchange.  For a love that can assure me to 
appear, it must be given freely; I must not demand it.  Ultimately, this is why Marion 
argues that the erotic reduction leads us to ask a further question.  In order to find 
assurance I cannot just ask the question, ‘Does anyone love me?,’ but I must proceed to 
the question, ‘Can I love another first?’  Marion believes that the former question 
requires moving to the latter.  I need to move to this question because it is only by 
seeking to love first that love occurs: “When, then, does the lover appear?  Precisely 
when, during the encounter, I suspend reciprocity, and no longer economize, engaging 
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myself without any guarantee of assurance.  The lover appears when one of the actors 
in the exchange no longer poses prior conditions, and loves without requiring to be 
loved, and thus, in the figure of the gift, abolishes economy” (2007: 78).  I can only 
love when I suspend my demand for assurance and instead seek to love another.   
But Marion’s claim that I can begin to love only when I no longer demand to be loved 
in return seems to point to agape as the core attitude of love.  Love happens only when 
I give up any selfish or self-concerned desires and aim purely at the good of the other.  
Love seems to occur only when I love the other in herself and not for any self-
concerned reason.  However, I do not think Marion intends to sublimate eros in agape 
and identify agape (or at least what is commonly defined as agape) as the only attitude 
in love.  He does not claim that I must only love another for herself apart from her 
relation to me.   
  
One reason why we should not read Marion as rejecting eros in favor of agape is that I 
do not entirely give up my desire for assurance in deciding to love.  Marion claims that 
I find a new kind of assurance when I choose to love:  
 
[W]hen I pass on to the question ‘Can I love first?’ what assurance can I 
legitimately hope for, as a lover?  Evidently not the assurance to be able 
to continue or to persevere in my being despite the suspicion of vanity, 
but the sole assurance appropriate to the radicalized erotic reduction—
not the assurance of being [l’assurance d’etre], nor of being itself [ni de 
l’etre], but the assurance of loving. . . understood as the pure and simple 
assurance of the precise fact that [I love] (2007: 73). 
 
The assurance that I have chosen to love is the only assurance that I can have at this 
point.  The assurance of choosing to love is not even the assurance that I actually love 
the other, because only the other can accept my love and assure me that I am loving. 
While the assurance of choosing to love is a very limited assurance, it is assurance 
nonetheless. 
 
But the assurance that I have chosen to love is not the only assurance I can ever hope 
for.  Marion insists that when I decide to love I do not give up my desire for assurance.  
Instead I replace my demand for assurance with the hope that another will love me and 
thus assure me:   
 
[The] lover, in the very moment of the most headlong advance, which 
frees him from reciprocity and from economy, still hopes by full rights 
in assurance, the assurance that someone loves him and defends him 
from vanity. . .  But this assurance would sink instantly into its contrary 
if he waited for it like the possession of an object that is certain. . .  Love 
thus only becomes thinkable according to the mode of the hoped for, of 
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that which can only come upon me as the radically unseen and 
unwarranted (2007: 88-89). 
 
My desire for assurance does not disqualify my love for the other.  I do not love if I 
demand reciprocal love, but I can still maintain the hope that another will love me.   
 
While Marion denies that love must be entirely self-forgetful because I still may hope 
for assurance, we must remember that Marion does not simply side with the proponents 
of eros who argue that all love is a form of self-love.  We cannot begin to love until we 
give up the demand that someone love me before I love her.  I do not love so that I will 
receive assurance.  This is to miss the very purpose of love.  I can hope that another 
will love me, but I can in no way demand it or guarantee it.    
 
 
The Unity of Agape and Eros 
 
The moment when I give up my demand to be loved and decide to love first is the 
moment that love appears.  According to Marion, both eros and agape share this 
fundamental movement as they are two names given for the same underlying reality.  
Now that we have seen the details of Marion’s account we can address how his account 
of agape and eros differs from the common assumptions made about the two loves that 
we noted above, as well as how his account differs from Derrida’s claim that love must 
be entirely without reciprocity. 
 
Marion summarizes the first distinction between self-forgetful agape and self-interested 
eros as follows: “[P]assionate love, which enjoys itself and possesses the other, would 
contrast with virtuous love, which gives to the other and forgets itself” (2007: 220-221).  
Eros is supposedly a love that is more concerned with the self than with the other, 
whereas agape must entirely forget the self in its concern for the other.  However, 
Marion argues that these distinctions do not reflect the shared similarities between eros 
and agape.   
 
Eros is concerned with the other, and not only with the self, just as much as agape is.  
According to Marion’s phenomenology of erotic love, the lover does not use the 
beloved as a means to her own enjoyment.  The erotic lover only becomes a lover by 
giving up on self-love and attempting to love first:  “But this same lover, who enjoys 
and possesses, nonetheless succeeds in doing so by forgetting and abandoning him- or 
herself first: in general and in principle by his or her advance” (2007: 221). The erotic 
lover must give up her own desire for assurance and seek to assure another.  Ultimately 
we receive our assurance from another when she assures me that I love her, when she 
assures me that I am faithful to her.  So, eros requires that I care for the other and not 
simply use the other for my own purposes.  Using the other for my own lustful desires 
is not love, and does not deserve to be called by the name.  But this seems like a very 
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unrealistic account of love.  Don’t we use the word love (as in “making love”) to refer 
to an act where no love may be exchanged at all?  Specifically, we sometimes use eros 
to mean an act of seduction, where the seducer only sees the other as an object to be 
conquered.  But seduction does not seem to have anything in common with agape.   
 
Marion argues not that seduction is a lower form of love, but that it does not reach the 
bar of erotic love at all.  Seduction cannot be called love because the seducer only 
wants to seduce so that the other loves him, without ever loving the other.  The seducer 
pretends to love to trick the other into loving him, at which point he will no longer love.  
From the very beginning he plans only to pretend to love so that he will receive the love 
of the other:  “Seduction wants to make itself loved without, in the end, loving—I only 
go about the advance with the firm resolution of losing it as soon as possible; I only 
lose myself in the advance so that someone comes to me and I thus find myself again; 
or rather so that I find her without her ever finding me again.  The advance disappears, 
like a lure I dangle, assuring me a free gain.  In seduction I take pleasure, but the 
pleasure is solitary” (2007: 83).  Seduction is not love because the seducer only tricks 
the other into loving him without actually loving the other.  
 
The case of seduction is not an instance of love because it does not presuppose eternity; 
the lover has not promised to love at this moment for all time.  While no one can 
presume to guarantee that one’s love will last forever, in declaring love for someone, I 
must do so under the promise of eternity.  To begin to love, I must desire to be faithful 
forever.  If I say “I love you” at the same time knowing that I am only going to love for 
a limited amount of time, then the love is not simply deficient, but it is not love at all.  
My choice to be faithful does not guarantee eternity, but I do not love if I know that I 
will love only for a limited amount of time.  Marion concludes that eros, and not just 
agape, requires the promise that I love for all time.  An attempt to love without the 
promise of eternity is not love because I will not assure the beloved that she matters.   
 
Marion responds to the second assumed distinction between an agape that 
dispassionately loves what is not lovable and an eros that loves only as a response to 
something attractive in the beloved by claiming that agape also passionately desires the 
other:  “The lover, he or she who preeminently renounces possession and reciprocity by 
taking his or her advance, nevertheless does enjoy, does eroticize through speech, 
jealously demands, too, and sometimes runs away. . .  One must have a good deal of 
naїvité or blindness, or rather know nothing of the lover and of erotic logic, not to see 
that [agape] possesses and consumes as much as [eros] gives up and abandons” (2007: 
221).  The lover who loves with agape desires the good for a specific other.  If she does 
not enjoy this other at all, then it is not love because the other is interchangeable with 
any other beloved and she will not be assured that her existence matters.  In order to 
love I must love this specific one.  I must look to give her assurance through my love. 
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Marion’s Response to Derrida 
 
Marion’s phenomenology of love also questions Derrida’s claim that love must be 
entirely without the desire for reciprocity.  Marion clearly contradicts Derrida’s claim 
by arguing that our hope for assurance is not something that we should ignore or deny.  
On this point, I think Marion’s argument is quite strong.  He acknowledges that love is 
not a one-way street.  There is a desire for reciprocity even though the lover realizes 
that reciprocity cannot be demanded.  Even John Milbank, who argues that Marion does 
not sufficiently account for reciprocity in love, acknowledges that Marion maintains the 
hope that another will love me:  “Thus against any Levinasian or Derridean eulogizing 
of the purely unilateral, Marion fully insists that the lover who advances goes on hoping 
for a reciprocating response even though he in no way demands it, requires it, or 
expects it. . .  Hence the lover goes on hoping for a response, not only in order to 
receive acceptance, but also to receive confirmation that his act of love is truly love” 
(2007: 261).  My hope for assurance that I love and that another loves me does not 
render love impossible, but it establishes love’s possibility. 
 
As we have seen, for Marion, all love includes a desire for reciprocity even if I cannot 
demand it.  Even in a traditional understanding, agape is not a “pure” form of love 
where I give up all desire for the other to acknowledge my love or even love me in 
return.  In order to truly love another with agape, I must desire the other’s good as my 
own good.  I must make another’s good my own, which might lead to a relationship 
because I desire the same thing the other does (her good).  Even in agape, I cannot get 
away from being pleased when another’s good is realized.  However, Derrida would 
have to argue that making another’s good my own is disqualified by the demand that no 
hint of reciprocity can be allowed in pure love.  To make another’s good my own would 
mean that I would receive something if the other’s good is realized.  If Derrida is 
correct about love, then love cannot even desire another’s good.  It must be so entirely 
self-forgetful that I do not know what I am doing because to give a pure gift I must not 
even know I am giving the gift for fear of economic calculation.   
 
Derrida’s demand for love, that I cannot make another’s good my own, leads to an 
extremely stilted view of love. Derrida’s call for a radical agape ends up requiring that 
I not even recognize the other at all.  In my goal of removing all my own desires from 
love I end up losing this particular other, the one directly in front of me.  Thus, only 
love for a generalized other—to use Emmanuel Levinas’s formulation: the widow, 
orphan, stranger—is possible.  Once an actual widow, orphan, or stranger comes across 
my path, I cannot love her because there would be a possible hint of reciprocity.  But, 
as I have shown, I think Marion provides good reasons to suggest that Derrida’s 
demand that love be without any possible thought or hint of reciprocity obscures the 
nature of love, which requires that I make another’s good my own.   
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Marion on Love and Its Reasons 
Besides providing an alternative to Derrida’s account of pure agape, Marion’s 
phenomenology of love also provides a very different approach to the topic of love and 
its reasons.  As I argued above, the traditional account of agape and eros holds that the 
reason why I love with agape rests entirely on the lover’s decision.  Derrida follows 
this traditional account of agape by claiming that the lover cannot desire anything in 
the beloved because that would mean that the lover loves in order to receive something 
in return.  The lover must not respond to any perceived value in the beloved, but agape 
only seeks to give itself away to the other.  On the other hand, the reason why one loves 
with eros is in response to some perceived value in the beloved.  In breaking down the 
traditional distinction between agape and eros Marion conceives of a very different 
account of why we love.   
 
Marion assumes that there is not just one reason why I love another; we cannot reduce 
love to one reason.  In love we do not merely ignore reciprocity; Marion insists that I 
can hope for it but I cannot demand it.  In order to even qualify as a lover I must love 
this particular lover. In other words, if I do not assure the other that I love her, if I love 
her with such a disinterested love that the beloved is interchangeable with any other, 
then it is not truly love. So Marion acknowledges that I still love another person 
because of the other.  The lover loves this particular beloved for reasons inherent in the 
beloved.  However, Marion also acknowledges that love does not appear until the lover 
decides to love without the expectation of receiving anything in return.  Thus the reason 
why I love this particular beloved is also found in my will.  When it comes to giving 
reasons for our love Marion insists that reasons reside both in our own will and in the 
beloved’s value.  Thus, Marion’s account of love truly is a unity of agape and eros.  
 
 
Critique of Marion’s Account of Love 
 
As I have argued, I think Marion is correct in identifying the paradox at the heart of 
love that in order to truly love I must give up my demand for assurance, although I still 
maintain the hope that another will love me.  However, in my view, Marion minimizes 
the extent to which reciprocity is necessary for love even though he accounts for 
reciprocity in at least two ways.  
 
One nod towards the necessary role of reciprocity in love is that even though his first-
person approach limits his focus to the individual’s experience of loving and being 
loved, he still argues that once we have worked our way through the erotic reduction 
we find that we have been preceded by love:  
 
I have learned that I never could have asked myself, ‘Does anyone out 
there love me?’ if another did not love me first.  It was necessary that I 
enter into the erotic reduction and that I advance under the form of the 
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lover in order that the logic of love lead me insensibly, but ineluctably, 
to comprehend that another loved me well before I loved her. . .  In fact, 
no one can claim, at least without lying to oneself or contradicting 
oneself, that no one loves him or has loved him (2007: 215). 
 
We could not enter the erotic reduction without someone loving us because in order to 
even ask the question someone must have considered our existence at least minimally 
worthwhile.   
 
A second way in which Marion minimally accounts for reciprocity is that, as we have 
seen, he holds that I should never give up the hope that another will love me in return.  I 
maintain the hope in a reciprocal relationship without demanding it.  Yet despite these 
nods toward reciprocity, he does not sufficiently account for reciprocity because he is 
too hesitant to allow any self-interest into love.   
 
Marion’s limiting of the role of reciprocity in love leads him to agree with Derrida that 
the purest form of love is one in which the other cannot possibly pay me back.  This 
leads him to claim that loving an anonymous beloved is the sincerest and best form of 
love.  Marion displays this tendency in a recent essay:   
 
In fact, the more I sincerely love (or think I love, which amounts to the 
same for me), the less the identity or the presence of the loved one is 
required.  I can love a woman or a man that I know only superficially, or 
that I do not know at all (based on his name, his reputation) or even 
about whom I know nothing.  I can love someone who is absent most of 
the time, and who will probably always remain thus, and I can even love 
someone absent who has never yet been present, not even for a moment.  
I can love a woman whom I have lost, or whom I have left.  I can love 
someone dead out of loyalty, and a child not yet born out of hope.  
Because I love, what I am in love with does not have to be at all, and can 
thus dispense altogether with maintaining the status of a being (2002b: 
44). 
 
While I agree with Marion that we can love, at least in a certain sense, someone who 
has died or an unborn child, I disagree with his claim that a love where the beloved is 
anonymous or not present is more sincere than a loving friendship.  According to 
Marion, loving an anonymous beloved is a more sincere form of love because I know 
that the other will not or cannot love me in return.  Marion appears more concerned 
with the lover’s purity than with the identity of the beloved.   
 
Marion’s claim that loving an anonymous beloved is the most sincere form of love 
obscures the nature of love in a few ways.  First, it can lead to a view of love that is so 
focused on the purity of the lover’s motivation that it forgets the other’s needs.  Marion 
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certainly is correct that I do not love another person if my sole focus is to get her to 
love me in return or to get something else from her.  However, if I am so focused on my 
own purity as a lover, then I can easily forget the beloved’s needs.  This is especially 
the case if the beloved is an anonymous beloved whose only identity is in my own 
mind.  A “woman whom I have lost” is no longer present to me.  So, while I may wish 
her well in a general sense, I am no longer in a relationship with her and cannot meet 
her needs as one who is in a proximate friendship with her might.  It hardly seems like 
wishing her good in an abstract sense is a more sincere form of love than getting my 
hands dirty and meeting her actual needs.     
 
Second, Marion’s view that loving a beloved who is not present is the clearest form of 
love misidentifies the nature of love because it is often far more difficult to love 
someone with whom we are in close proximity.  Often our love is tested most by the 
one we love who mistreats us, is unfaithful, or simply takes our love for granted.  It is 
in these situations where we may realize the purity of our love for another.  Do I love 
my daughter merely for the satisfaction of being loved in return?  Or, will I love my 
daughter despite the fact that she may never return my love?  It seems that it is in these 
particularly close relationships that love is most tested and purified.  If an anonymous 
recipient of my charity takes my love for granted I can simply move on to another 
beloved; but if one with whom I am in a close relationship rejects my love, then I am 
shaken and must face the question, why do I love her?  It is the risk of rejection by the 
beloved, the giving up of the demand for assurance that must be taken in order to love 
fully.  
 
Finally, Marion’s emphasis on love for a beloved who is not present as the most sincere 
form of love undermines his very definition of love as what gives us the assurance that 
our existence matters.  If I sincerely love a woman “I do not know at all,” then in what 
possible sense is she assured?  If somehow this woman finds out about my love for her, 
she will not be assured because she can rightly object that I do not love her; I only love 
how she appears to me.  If I can love a beloved who is not present, then the only one 
who might receive any assurance is me.  Thus, in attempting to purify all self-interest 
from love, Marion’s account of love ends up losing the other’s need for assurance.  We 
both need assurance, but, as Marion has rightly argued, I must give up my demand for 
assurance in order to assure the other that her existence matters.  Marion’s emphasis on 
the purity of love ends up leading his account of love away from his initial insight that 
to love another requires that I give the beloved assurance that she matters.  
Additionally, Marion’s focus on love’s purity implies that the ultimate reason why I 
should love another person rests in my own choice instead of in the other.  
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Conclusion 
 
I think Marion’s argument that eros and agape share many characteristics, that they are 
two movements of the one act of love, is a compelling argument overall.  Marion 
properly agrees with defenders of eros who claim that we want (and need) to be 
reciprocally loved by others.  At the same time, Marion rightly denies that my demand 
for assurance leads to love.  I appear as lover only when I give up my demand for 
assurance and seek to love without being loved in return (agape).  But contrary to the 
common definition of agape, this does not mean I should ignore my desire for 
assurance.  I should hope for assurance, but not demand it.  However, as I have argued, 
Marion’s claim that loving an anonymous beloved who cannot pay me back suggests 
that he has not adequately accounted for the full range of reciprocity in love.  His erotic 
phenomenon looks too much like Derrida’s pure agape. 
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1 This quote is Armstrong’s summary of Nygren’s position on eros.  Armstrong questions Nygren’s 
interpretation eros although he still privileges agape to eros: “It is of course necessary to find a place for 
the passionate love of desire and aspiration, even if that place is far below that held by the love of divine 
generosity and sacrificial self-giving” (105). 
 
2 I will not provide anything close to a full account of Derrida’s account of the gift, or of Marion’s 
acceptance and critique of Derrida’s requirements for the gift.  For a full account of Derrida and Marion 
on the gift see Horner (2001).   
 
3 For Marion’s arguments that the gift can be thought, but only according to the horizon of givenness see 
Marion (1999: 122-143); cf. Marion (2002a: 71-118). 
 
4 While The Erotic Phenomenon follows Descartes’ Meditations in not employing any references, I think 
it is clear that one of Marion’s main interlocutors is Derrida and his discussion of the gift.  
 
5 For an introduction to Marion’s phenomenology of the saturated phenomenon see Marion (2000). 
 
6 Marion’s claim that we need infinite love for assurance does not imply that only divine love can assure 
me.  His claim is that the love must come from someone who promises to love for all time. 
